Oops!...I think I scanned a malware by Nassi, Ben et al.
Oops!...I think I scanned a malware
Ben Nassi
Dept. of Software and
Information Systems Eng.,
Ben-Gurion University
of the Negev,
Be’er-Sheva, Israel
nassib@post.bgu.ac.il
Adi Shamir
Computer Science
department,
Weizmann Institute
of Science,
Rehovot, Israel
adi.shamir@weizmann.ac.il
Yuval Elovici
Dept. of Software and
Information Systems Eng.,
Ben-Gurion University
of the Negev,
Be’er-Sheva, Israel
elovici@bgu.ac.il
Abstract
This article presents a proof-of-concept illustrating the feasi-
bility of creating a covert channel between a C&C server and a
malware installed in an organization by exploiting an organiza-
tion’s scanner and using it as a means of interaction. We take
advantage of the light sensitivity of a flatbed scanner, using a
light source to infiltrate data to an organization. We present
an implementation of the method for different purposes (even
to trigger a ransomware attack) in various experimental setups
using: (1) a laser connected to a stand (2) a laser carried by a
drone, and (3) a hijacked smart bulb within the targeted organi-
zation from a passing car. In our experiments we were able to
infiltrate data using different types of light sources (including
infrared light), from a distance of up to 900 meters away from
the scanner. We discuss potential counter measures to prevent
the attack.
1. Introduction
The popularity of computer scanners has increased significantly
since they were first introduced, and today they are commonly
used by organizations and individuals to scan images, hand-
writing, as well as printed text to a digital image [33]. Con-
sidered the successors of traditional fax input devices, scanners
are based on the concept of telephotography, however instead
of enabling the transmission of simple text, entire images can
be transmitted by a scanner. In recent years, different types
of scanners [36] have been introduced, including: sheet-fed
scanners, integrated scanners, drum scanners and even portable
scanners. Probably the most popular type of scanner is the
flatbed scanner, sometimes called a reflective scanner, which
works by shining white light onto the scanned object and read-
ing the intensity and color of the light that is reflected from it.
Even today, nearly three decades since they were initially in-
troduced, the popularity of flatbed scanners continues, and they
are sold as an integrated part of a multi-function printer and as
a standalone device. Even in the new era of smartphones, scan-
ners continue to exist because they provide higher resolution
output than any other device.
In this article we present a novel method to infiltrate data into an
organization. Our method uses light transmitted by an attacker
to a flatbed scanner, which is then extracted by a malware in-
stalled in the organization. Our method exploits an organiza-
tion’s scanner which serves as a gateway to the organization,
in order to establish a covert channel between a malware and
an attacker. The attacker controlling the light source can be
located far away from the targeted scanner. We present differ-
ent experimental setups using several types of light sources and
varying visibility and distance from the targeted scanner: (1)
an external laser installed on a stand positioned far away but
within clear sight of the scanner, (2) an external laser connected
to a micro-controller installed on a drone, remotely controlled
by an attacker to approach the scanner when clear sight to the
targeted scanner is available at a very close distance and even
by (3) an internal smart bulb within the organization that was
hijacked by an Android device located in a passing car.
The motivation to establish a covert channel for data infiltration
can vary from the aim of triggering a malware to encrypt critical
files (ransomware), a day before an important presentation, to
harming an organization by deleting important files.
A persistent attacker eventually finds a way to bypass security
measures in order to infect a computer in the organization with
a malware. Even isolated networks are not protected against
malware infection as was shown in the cases of Stuxnet[32]
and the Equation Group APT[19]. The main challenge of the
attacker is to find ways to control the malware without being
detected. Given a malware/bot installed on organizations’ in-
ternal network, the proliferation of flatbed scanners and their
connection to the network of the organization, countless orga-
nizations are vulnerable to our attack; the equipment required
to establish the covert channel can be purchased for less than
$20 on eBay.
The contribution of this research is our ability to exploit a le-
gitimate flatbed scanner to establish a covert channel between a
C&C server and a malware (previously installed in the organi-
zation). This proposed covert channel can evade existing secu-
rity measures that focus on monitoring suspicious cyber-attack
activities using commercial tools such intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDS/IPS), firewalls, and data leakage pre-
vention (DLP) systems.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides an overview
of the related work, and section 3 contains the necessary back-
ground to understand the scanning process and the vulnerability
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exploited by the covert channel. Section 4 describes the general
schema to establish the covert channel, the parties involved, the
challenges, and the protocol. Sections 5, 6 describe the algo-
rithms of the attacker and the malware. Section 7 presents anal-
ysis of the factors involved in the attack. Sections 89 present
different implementations of the the attack: (1) when a clear
line of sight to the scanner is available, and (2) when a clear
line of sight is not available. In section 11 we discuss counter
measures, and in section 12 we provide a summary.
2. Related Work
In this section we describe the topic of covert channels and air-
gapped networks and present related work in this area. The
term covert channel was coined by Lampson [35, 20] who de-
fined it as creating a capability to transfer information between
parties that are not supposed to be allowed to communicate by
measures that were not designed for communication. Covert
channels can be used to circumvent system and network poli-
cies, by establishing communication that has not been consid-
ered in the design of the computing system for the purpose of
communicating under the radar.
There are many ways to establish a covert channel between two
parties. In some cases a bidirectional channel is established in
which two parties can communicate fully. Other methods in-
clude a one way channel whereby only one party can transmit
data, and the second party can receive it (broadcasting). The
unidirectional covert channels can be used for various purposes
including: (1) exfiltration of data from an organization (2) infil-
tration of data to an infected computer inside the organization’s
network from a C&C server.
One well-known method of establishing a covert channel is by
exploiting acoustical emanations. Previous studies [25, 14, 5]
presented a method to establish a bidirectional covert channel
between two parties using inaudible sound. The main disadvan-
tage of this method is that sound deteriorates with distance, so
the parties must remain a reasonable distance from one another.
Another famous method used to establish a covert channel ex-
ploits optical emanations. A research over a decade ago, [21]
explored information leakage using devices’ LED lights. They
classified devices (such as modems, storage devices, CD-ROM
drives and others) into three classes based on how informative
the device’s LED projection is (in term of information that can
be gathered by watching it). More recent work [29], showed
how to establish a unidirectional channel to exfiltrate data from
an organization using a smart bulb. Other research used the
same principle to exfiltrate data using a monitor’s LED indica-
tor [30].
Less well-known means of establishing a covert channel used
temperature as an indicator of the bits. Recent research [22]
showed how to establish a thermal channel between different
cores in multicore platforms to create a bidirectional channel.
Other research [13] used the same principle of thermal channels
to exfiltrate data from one computer to another assuming they
are positioned side by side. In both cases, the covert channel is
based on a process that either heats or cools a device and a sen-
sor to measure the change of temperature. This measurement
is then demodulated to bits. This method primary disadvantage
is its low transmission rate which is a result of the time needed
to hit and cool the device.
Covert channels have also been investigated in air-gapped net-
works where they are used for communication with a compro-
mised computer. Air-gapped networks are isolated networks
that are not connected to the Internet and don’t provide a way to
communicate with computers that are outside of the air-gapped
network. They are primarily used within closed organizations
(e.g. military), in order to prevent confidential data from being
transfered outside the network. In this context, covert channels
are used in order to bridge the air gap and exfiltrate data from
an infected computer connected to the air-gapped network to a
device located outside the network, in the outside world. An-
other research [12] showed how to establish a unidirectional
covert channel by transmitting a radio signal from a compro-
mised isolated computer using the display video unit to a mo-
bile phone with a radio receiver. In other work [11] researchers
established a unidirectional covert channel by exfiltrating data
from an isolated computer to a mobile phone using a software
that transmitted electromagnetic signals at cellular frequencies
by invoking specific memory-related instructions and utilizing
the multi-channel memory architecture to amplify the transmis-
sion.
In this article we present a novel and relatively easy to imple-
ment scheme to establish a covert channel that uses different
light sources (such as laser and infrared beams) to interact with
a malware that has been previously deployed in a network. In
the rest of the paper we refer to our method in the context of
bridging an air-gapped network, although it is not limited to this
type of network, and it can be deployed in any other network.
3. Sensitivity of Flatbed Scanners
In this section we describe how a flatbed scanner works [38, 23,
33, 36]. A flatbed scanner is made up of a lamp that is passed
over a pane (from the bottom) to illuminate the scanner’s pane.
Using a series of lenses and mirrors, the light is bounced back
to a light sensory array (CCD). A lens splits the image into
three colors and the associated electrical charge is measured.
The brighter the light reflected, the greater the electrical charge.
Finally, an ADC device converts the electrical charge to a bi-
nary code that represents the document that is located on the
pane. The scanning process results in a file in a configured for-
mat (such as PDF, PNG, etc.) that is transferred to a computer
for storage by a direct physical connection between the scan-
ner and the computer or using a network connection (wired or
wireless).
Since the entire scanning process is influenced by the reflected
light, interfering with the light that is illuminated on the pane
will result in a different electrical charge which will therefore
be parsed to a different binary representation of the scanned
material. We wanted to examine the effect of external lighting
on the scanner (during the scanning process). We conducted an
experiment in which we used a flatbed scanner, which was par-
tially open and located on a table. Figure 1a contains the output
of a scan that was conducted in a room a in which the light was
turned on at the beginning of the scan and turned off in the
Figure 1: Sensitivity of scanners to different light sources (from left to right): (1a) alternating room’s light, (1b) alternating
flashlight, (1c) alternating infrared laser pen, (1d) alternating laser on a document (1e) alternating screen saver of a monitor
Figure 2: Scanning process. Taken from Wikipedia
middle of the scan. Figure 1b shows an output of a scan that
was taken when a flashlight of a mobile phone flickered on the
pane. As can be seen, the scanner is sensitive to a change in the
room’s lighting, even the subtle change caused by the illumi-
nation of a mobile phone flashlight results in brighter shades.
This light sensitivity causes the scanner to produce different
shades in the output (binary representations) when the same ex-
perimental setup is used with different lighting conditions. The
experiment was repeated with different flatbed scanners, and
they were all found to be sensitive to external illumination even
when a document was left on the their pane (as can see in figure
1d. In addition, the scanners were sensitive to all of the kinds of
lights used (i.e. the color of the light did not impact the results).
Another interesting observation is that scanner light sensitivity
is not limited to the visible spectrum, but also includes infrared
light. Figure 1c contains the output of a scan that was taken
while an infrared laser pen was flickered on it. An infrared
light, that can’t be detected by the human eye causes the same
effect on scanner output.
Since the output of the scan is highly influenced by external
illumination, it can serve as the infrastructure to deliver mes-
sages from an external attacker to an organization that contains
a flatbed scanner.
4. The Attack
In this section we describe the threat model, the parties in-
volved, the interactions, the assumptions, the challenges, and
finally the considerations that led us to select the protocol to
transmit data as a light sequence.
4.1 Threat Model
Our attack’s goal is to use the scanner as a gateway to an organi-
zation/home in order to infiltrate data/commands to a malware
that has been deployed on a compromised computer/network.
We use the scanner as a way to establish a covert channel be-
tween an external attacker and a malware installed in an orga-
nization. In this attack there are four parties involved:
1. Attacker’s computer - This is a C&C server operated by
the attacker that controls a light source for the purpose
of modulating commands. The attacker’s control of the
light source may be based on wired or wireless commu-
nication.
2. Light Source - The light source can be an external light
source that is connected to a micro-controller and be-
longs to the attacker. The micro-controller modulates
a given command (represented in binary code) from the
C&C server as a sequence of lights corresponding to the
given command (the protocol used will be discussed later).
The external light source and the micro-controller can be
installed on a stand or even carried by a drone using a
wireless connection to the C&C (the attacker’s PC). An-
other option is to use an internal light source, located in
the organization which the attacker has managed to con-
trol remotely (hijack).
3. Flatbed Scanner - The flatbed scanner is located in the
organization and is connected to the organization’s net-
work.
4. Compromised Computer within the Organization - Con-
nected to the Organization’s Network, This computer has
been infected with a malware that can be used to com-
mand the scanner to lunch a scan and access the output
(scanned digital image). The malware extracts the com-
mand sent from the C&C and executes it.
The attacker controls a light source that modulates the data as a
âA˘IJlight signalâA˘I˙ to a partially opened scanner during scan-
ning. The scanning is launched by the malware in order to re-
ceive commands at known times (known both by the attacker
and the malware). The malware extracts the command from
the scan and executes it from the infected computer within the
organization. The malware can then use the scanner to send
an acknowledgment notification back to the attacker or to ex-
filtrate data from the organization by modulating the 1/0 bits as
lights sent by launching scans.
4.2 Assumptions
We assume that the attacker has already successfully managed
to infect a computer in an air-gapped network that has direct
access to a scanner. Such a malware could be installed via a
supply chain attack, by a malicious or unsuspecting insider, via
Figure 3: Information Flow
active spear phishing emails, etc. Regarding the location of the
scanner, we assume one of the following:
1. A clear line of sight from the outside to the scanner is
exists - The scanner is located in a room with external
wall. Two scenarios exist: (1) the wall may allow outside
light to pass (e.g., curtain wall), or (2) the wall contain a
window.
2. A clear line of sight to the scanner is not exists - In this
case, a device that produces light and can be hijacked is
located in proximity of the scanner.
It is important to note that we do not make any assumptions
about the physical distance between the attacker and the orga-
nization (the two parties can be located far away from another
or nearby). We also do not assume anything regarding the win-
dow’s state (closed or open).
4.3 Challenges and Solutions
1. Physical Obstacles - The presence of obstacles can pre-
vent an attacker from establishing a clear line of sight
with the targeted scanner. For example this can occur
when the targeted scanner is located on a very high floor
that the attacker cannot reach or when the scanner is lo-
cated in an isolated area of a building, far away from
the attacker. Establishing a clear line of sight can be ac-
complished with the use of a drone equipped with the
equipment required to conduct the attack and cellular
connection that enables the attacker to send commands
remotely; in addition, a powerful laser can be used to
transmit the data in cases of long distance between the
attacker and the targeted scanner.
2. Synchronization - Since the attacked network can be air-
gapped, there may be no way to communicate with a
malware in order to schedule scans. This problem can
be solved by hardcoding the time of the scan to be fixed
(e.g., every day at 23:00) in the code of the malware.
Another option is to hardcode the time of first scan in
the malware code and include the date of the next scan
in the infiltrated data. The attacker can avoid minor time
differences between the time that the scan was launched
and the time that the attack launched using a camera to
identify the beginning of the scan and trigger the attack.
The camera may be installed on a drone or in another
location within clear sight of the scanner.
3. Identifying a Scan - A problem can occur when an at-
tack was not performed, and the malware must be able
to identify these situations and ignore them. This prob-
lem can be solved by using a hardcoded prefix in each
command as an identifier of the attack.
4.4 The Protocol
In order to establish a communication channel using the
output of a scan a protocol that exploits a scanner’s sen-
sitivity to external illumination must be used. As was
shown in section 3, the effect of external illumination
on the pane of the scanner results in brighter shades in
the output of the scan (compared to the original shade).
Given a command/data represented as a sequence of 1
and 0 (the original command is parsed to ASCI and rep-
resented in binary) and a light source pointed at the scan-
ner or in proximity to the scanner, we modulate the bits
as follows: we turn on the light source to indicate a 1
bit (i.e., illuminating on the pane) We turned off the light
source to indicate a 0 bit. We pad the sequence with 1001
at both the beginning and the end of the command/data to
be sent. Padding helps address potential problems of dis-
tinguishing between an empty packet and data that has
not been transmitted). In addition, padding also helps
identify the beginning and the end of the signal on from
the output of the scanner and it allow the malware to cal-
culate the window size of each bit of the scan (described
in section 6).
Figure 4 presents the original image that was scanned
from the sequence of 1010...01 without padding using
a laser that was controlled by a micro-controller. We
found that different experimental setups, such as differ-
ent distances, result in different shades to indicate a 1/0
bit. Adding padding that contains 1 and 0 bits helps the
malware’s code to identify the RGB value that associ-
ated with each of the bits. It allow the code to extract
the values of the shades dynamically rather than making
assumptions regarding them (described in section 6).
5. Attacker’s Algorithm
This section describes the attacker’s algorithm. More
precisely, we present how the algorithm that is deployed
on the micro-controller (and connected to the light source)
modulates a given command to attack a scanner accord-
ing to the protocol discussed in subsection 4.4.
Figure 4: Output scans of the signal 1010..01 being transmitted by a laser from different distances (left to right): 3.2, 4.5, 7
meters.
Algorithm 1 Attacker’s Algorithm
1: procedure ATTACK(command,window)
2: cmd← getInBinary(commad)
3: paddedCmd← applyPadding(cmd)
4: index← 0
5: length← length(paddedCmd)
6: while (index< length) do
7: if (paddedCmd[index] == 1) then project()
8: else dontProject()
9: index← index+1
10: wait(window)
Algorithm 1 presents the stages of attack execution. The
only parameter that is required to execute the protocol
(besides the command itself) is a transmission window.
First, the given command is represented as an array of
1/0 in binary (line 2). Then suffix and prefix padding are
added to the binary representation as discussed in sub-
section 4.4 (line 3). Finally, the code is iterated over the
array (lines 4-10). The light source is turned on to indi-
cate a 1 bit and turned off the to indicate a 0 bit. The last
command of the code is to wait a given period of time be-
fore proceeding to iterate. The reason for waiting before
proceeding to the next iteration is to ensure that the light
source is either opened or closed for the given amount of
time that is denoted by the window (rate of a single bit).
The rate of a single bit is primarily influenced by the
ability of the scanner to absorb fast switches cleanly (de-
scribe in section 7, the ability of the light source to switch
between on/off states quickly and the speed of the scan-
ning that adapts the required resolution. The speed of
scanning can be measured by the attacker before the at-
tack by performing a scan using the same type of scanner
in the attacker’s home/lab, or by reading the scanner’s
specifications. Given a scan speed and a sequence of bits
(generated from a command), the window parameter can
be computed by:
window=
Timeo f scanning(ms)
#bits
(1)
6. Malware’s Algorithm
This section describes the algorithm of the malware. As
discussed in subsection 4.2 the malware is previously in-
stalled on one of the organization’s computer. The mal-
ware algorithm should be able to (1) execute a scan at
a scheduled time and (2) extract a command from the
scanned image. The algorithm’s main challenge is to ex-
tract the command in various experimental setups, each
of which will result in the same signal being scanned dif-
ferently. As can be seen in figure 4, the white shades
corresponding to the 1 bit deteriorates in each of the im-
ages, depending on the distance between the laser and the
scanner, and therefore algorithm should be immune to
shade’s changes. Algorithm 2 presents the signal extrac-
tion without hard-coded colors to identify 1 and 0 bits.
This algorithm should be executed at a scheduled time
Algorithm 2 Malware’s Algorithm
1: procedure SCANANDEXTRACTCOMMAND(())
2: path← scan()
3: image [] []← loadToRGB(path)
4: contrast [] []← applyContrast(image)
5: background ← getDominantColor(contrast)
6: lineAverage []← averageLines(contrast,background)
7: threshold←max(lineAverage)/2
8: strechedSignal []← strechSignal(lineAverage,threshold)
9: paddedSignal []← extractSignal(strechedSignal)
10: signal []← removePadding(paddedSignal)
11: applyCommand(signal)
that is known by the attacker (the attacker can hard-code
the first scan date and supply the next date in each attack
or hard-code all of dates alternatively). First, the algo-
rithm triggers the scan (line 2) and loads the image to the
memory as a two dimensional RGB array(line 3). A con-
trast function is applied to the image to emphasize the
shade of the bits (line 4) and the background color (line
5) in is then extracted (the value with the most appear-
ances in the matrix). A vector of lineAverage is com-
puted (line 6); each index i in the vector is calculated by
averaging the line and normalizing the value according
to the background value:
lineAverage[i] =
columns
∑
col=0
(
contrast[i][col]
columns
)−background
(2)
A stretching is applied to the values of lineAverage (lines
7-8) to produce a new signal, where each value in index
i of the new signal is 1 (if it is larger than the threshold)
or 0 (if it is smaller than the threshold). The signal is
then extracted by identifying the padding prefix and suf-
fix in the signal that starts and ends the signal, (line 9)
and removing the padding from it(line 10). Finally, the
Figure 5: Signal Extraction
command is executed (line 11).
The algorithm assumes that the infiltrated packet size is
less than half the size of the image. It will ensure that
the background will be selected as the 0 bit. The attacker
should design the transmission rate of the bits such that it
results in a scan that takes less than half of the scanning
time (half of the length of the image). Different kind of
algorithms can be used to extract the code. We chose this
algorithm because it is simple to implement.
Figure 5 presents the signal extracted from the sequence
of 101010...101. The positive effect of applying contrast
to the image is demonstrated by comparing the image
before the contrast to the image after contrast.
7. Analysis of the Attack
This section presents an analysis of the four main factors
in designing the attack: the type of light source to use, the
distance between the scanner and the attacker, the rate of
transmission, and the time of the attack.
7.1 Influence of Light Source
There are two types of light sources that can be used by
the attacker to perform the attack: visible and invisible
light. As mentioned in section 3, scanners are sensitive
to both types (see figure 1). In a case of an organization
with a window with an IR filter (e.g., sunlight filters or a
curtain wall), a visible light source can be used to attack
the scanner. The selection of the specific light is primar-
ily a function of the conditions of the room in which the
targeted scanner is located. We prefer to use IR light
whenever it is possible since it cannot be detected by
the naked eye, making it an ideal covert communication
channel.
7.2 Influence of Distance
Selecting the distance to attack a scanner using an exter-
nal source light is highly influenced by the experimental
setup (such as line of sight) and the intensity of the used
light source. If the attacker has a clear line of sight to
the scanner from his location he can use a stand to di-
rect the source light (such as laser) to point to the pane
of the scanner and perform the attack. Alternatively, the
attacker can install the laser on a drone to minimize the
Figure 6: Difference between 1 and 0 shades of Red, Green,
Blue values from different distances. X axes represents the
distance in cm between the attacker and scanner. Y axes
represents the difference between 1/0 shades.
distance in order to create a clear line of sight to the pane
of the scanner and launch the attack remotely.
There are few issues to be considered. First, there is a
trade-off between the stability that is required in order to
attack a scanner from a distance of 10 meters away versus
100 meters away; the light source must remain stable in
order to reach the scanner and perform the attack. This
is extremely crucial when using a drone equipped with a
light source to attack a scanner.
Second, since light deteriorates with distance, the attacker
need to use a light source that is strong enough to project
the light the necessary distance. This need demonstrated
in figure4 which shows how the quality of the scanned
image is compromised, to the point that it cannot be ex-
tracted, when the distance between the attacker and the
scanner increases.
Third, another important observation is that the distance
of lighting influences also on the diameter of projection
on the scanner pane. The projected diameter is decreases
when the distance decreases. In our experiments we found
that the best way to effect the result of a scan is with a
diameter that covers the entire pane of the scanner. Since
small distances between a laser and a scanner result in
small diameters that is too focused in a specific dot on
the pane it results in weak spreadness of the light on the
Figure 7: Illustration of the focal (f), distance (D), diame-
ter(R). The focal can calculated by equation 6
pane. Again, the quality of the image is compromised,
when the distance between the attacker and the scanner
decreases under a threshold.
The attacker’s goal is to produce a clear scan (i.e max-
imize the differences between the 1/0 bits) so the mal-
ware will extract the signal correctly. The trade-off be-
tween the diameter of the projected light and the inten-
sity of the light that is projected is presented on figure
6. The figure presents the differences in the RGB values
between the 1/0 shades as a function of the distance of
projection. This graph was produced from seven experi-
ments in which we used the same 300mW red laser under
the same experimental setups from different distances (0-
700cm). We extracted the shades of the 1/0 bits (from
each output) and calculated the difference between them.
The 1st interval of the graph, (0-40cm), shows a linear
(even asymptote) behavior, as in this range the laser did
not cover the scanner area. The 2nd interval (40-160cm)
shows that increasing the distance increases the intensity
of the shades as a result of a diameter optimization. The
3rd interval (160-450cm) shows that increasing the dis-
tance damaged the intensity of the laser. The 4th inter-
val (450-700cm) shows linear (even asymptotic) behav-
ior. The optimum distance to attack the scanner using the
laser we used is from 160cm as it got the highest differ-
ence of RGB values between 1/0 bit. This optimum is
achieved when achieving the minimal diameter to cover
the pane. We computed the difference of the RGB shades
as a function of the distance using Lagrange interpolation
(equations 3,4,5.
Red =−1.2915x7 +2.61−12x6−2.03−09x5
+7.88−07x4−0.0001x3 +0.01x2−0.35x+12 (3)
Green= 1.07−18x7 +9.08−14x6−1.65−10x5
+1.08−07x4−3.1−05x3 +0.003x2 +0.03x+13
(4)
Blue=−1.37−15x7 +2.7−12x6−2.1−9x5
+8.36−7x4−0.0001x3 +0.01x2−0.4x+13 (5)
One option to focus the projection and maximize the in-
tensity of the light is by using a lens on top of the light
source. Figure 7 illustrates the required circle to cover
the scanner and the parameters of distance and diame-
ter. The required lens’s focal point can be calculated as a
function of the distance (D), the laser diameter (r) and the
required projection circle (R) to cover the scanner using
Figure 8: Scans and Extracted signals in different rates
(100ms,50ms,25ms,10ms,5ms)
Transmission Rate Extracted Signal Number ofErrors
100 ms 10101010101010101010101010101 0
50 ms 10101010101010101010101010101 0
25 ms 00101010101010101010101010101 1
10 ms 11111111111111111111111111111 14
5 ms 10011111111111111111111111111 15
Table 1: Number of Errors of Extracting the sig-
nal 10101010101010101010101010101 in different rates of
transmission.
the next formula:
f ocallength=
r ∗D
R− r [meter] (6)
7.3 Influence of Transmission Rate
As can be seen in figure 4, from a sequence of two alternating
bits we can calculate the window (in terms of corresponding
number of lines to a single bit) from the malware’s perspective.
When using padding, the first two bits are: 10, and the rate
of transmission of a single bit can be calculated by identifying
the first line of transmission of the 1 bit denoted by f irst, and
the first line of transmission of the 0 bit is denoted by last to
calculate the window as follows:
Rate(#lines) = f irst− last (7)
By calculating the rate dynamically we can change the rates of
transmission in each scan in order to infiltrate more/less data
(depending on the action we want the malware to apply) with-
out the need to change the malware. The number of lines (trans-
mission rate) that adapt to infiltrate a single bit are influenced
by the speed of the scan and by the rate of transmission. We
want to maximize the amount of the data that we are can in-
filtrate. The limitations from the attacker side on the maxi-
mum rate of transmission are influenced by the ability of the
attacker’s light source to switch its states between the on and
off. From the malware side The limitation on the maximum
rate of transmission is the ability to identify correctly the bits
1/0 bits to reconstruct the signal.
Figure 8 presents the scanning and the extracted signal of the
sequence 10101010101010101010101010101 with different trans-
mission rates for a single bit (100ms,50ms,25ms,15ms,10ms,5ms).
Figure 9: Schema of the attack using external light source.
Figure 10: Experimental setup (from left to right): (a) The Inspire 1 equipped with the laser (circled in green) and the
Edison SoC, (b) the attacked organization during the attack, a green laser is projecting on a scanner behind a curtain wall
in the 3rd floor, (c) the scanner in the office from the inside
As can be seen from the figure, different transmission rates re-
sult in thinner sequence of columns that correspond to a single
bit. Table 1 presents the error (number of incorrect bits) of the
extracted signal for each of the rates. Using our laser and our
scanner, we found that maximum infiltration rate possible to
use without any errors is 50 milliseconds. An error correcting
code can be integrated to the malware’s code to detect and cor-
rect the extracted code for rates faster than 50 milliseconds. It
is important to note that the speed of scanning can be changed
by configuring different resolutions (Dots Per Inch) of the out-
put scan. In the entire set of experiments described in this arti-
cle we used standard quality of 300 dpi (default quality of the
scanner), that lasted around 8 seconds. Higher resolution re-
sults in slower scanning and can help the attacker to infiltrate
more data.
7.4 Influence of Time
We checked the influence of the hour of the day on the attack.
We were able to perform the attack during day and night. Pick-
ing the hour to attack is only a consideration of minimizing the
amount of people in the organization.
8. Infiltration of commands with a clear line
of sight to the scanner
The first scenario demonstrates few attacks using an external
light source when a clear line of sight to the scanner is available.
We implement the first type of attack using an external light
source connected to a micro-controller. The micro-controller
can be installed on a stand if clear sight to the targeted scan-
ner is available. Another possibility is installing the micro-
controller on a drone to improve the sight of the target laser
and control the micro-controller remotely using GSM commu-
nication from the C&C.
Figure 9 presents the steps of the attack. An attacker’s PC gen-
erates a sequence of binary signals transferred a micro-controller
(phases 1-2). The micro-controller launch the attack by mod-
ulating the received signal as light sequence using a connected
laser that is directed to a scanner’s pane while the scanner is
scanning (phase 3). Next, the scan is extracted to a command
(phases 4-5), and executed by the APT (phases 6-7). Finally,
a message sent from the scanner to the attacker by modulating
the bits of the message as scan and emitting visible light pulses
from the flatbed (phase 8). The emitted light is captured by a
drone equipped with a video recorder (maintaining a line-of-
sight with the scanner). Finally, the video is processed by the
attacker to extract the message from the malware.
8.1 Experimental Setup
The described attack presents harming an organization, located
in the 3rd floor in its building, by deleting an important file.
The organization contained HP OfficeJet Pro8610 [16] a multi-
function printer with a scanner and a fax connected to the net-
work of the organization located on a table within a room as
can be seen in figure (10)c. As can be seen in figure 10b, the
building constructed from curtain walls that filters the sunlight
and IR. So we decided to use a visible green laser that was dis-
mantled from a laser pen (bought from eBay and operates on
600mW). We build an electrical circuit as follows: We took an
Intel Edison [17], System on a chip (SoC), and connected it to
a battery and the green laser. We installed the code described
in section 5 on the Edison. We installed the Edison SoC on
top of the Inspire 1 pro (a drone) [8] while the laser was in-
stalled on its camera that was positioned on the stabilizer of the
drone to maximize the stability during the attack. The drone
equipped with the Edison and the laser can be seen in figure
10. The video from the camera of the drone was streamed to
an Android application [7] using radio signals. We established
a communication channel between the C&C computer and the
Figure 11: Extracted Signal delete x.pdf, from top to bottom: (a) The original signal, (b) the signal after contrast, (c) line
averaging (c) Stretching unpadding and ASCI representation
Figure 12: Left to right: (a) The laser with the stand. (b) The attacked office with the scanner. (c) The IR projector.
Intel Edison SoC using its WiFi interface over a hot-spot that
was opened from a mobile phone. The attacker had the ability
to (1) launch the attack using the Edison SoC remotely from
the C&C and to (2) maneuver the drone using its joystick and
watch the streamed video in an Android application.
As for the malware, we implemented the code described in sec-
tion 6 using a python library Pyinsane [1]. We installed the mal-
ware on a computer inside the organization that was connected
to its internal network. The malware scanned the network for
a scanner (we found the IP of the scanner dynamically) and
triggered by the scanner to launch a scan exactly at 23:00.
8.2 Results
The attack was recorded and uploaded to a link:1. We flied the
drone to stand in front of the scanner in the 3rd floor from a
distance of 15 meters and launched the attack after we detected
that a scan was launched using the camera of the drone (23:00).
We used a transmission rate of 50 milliseconds for each bit and
infiltrated the command of "d x.pdf" where d is correlative to
delete and x.pdf is the file to delete. Only 7 bytes are required
(including the space) to encode this command. We padded the
command with 1001 prefix and 1001 suffix (as described in
section 4.4. The padding added one more byte results in 8 bytes
in total. The infiltration time took 3.2 seconds (64 bits that
were transmitted in a rate of 50 milliseconds per bit). This was
the entire time that the laser was used. The malware extracted
the signal in real-time and sent an acknowledgment message
by triggering another scan after the command was executed.
Figure 11 presents the output of each of the stages of the signal
extraction process as was described in section 6. 1
We repeated the experiment with much powerful laser (10W)
that we installed on a dedicated stand from 900 meters from
the targeted scanner (that was located in another room) as pre-
sented in figures 12a and 12b. We successfully infiltrated data
to the scanner and received its acknowledgment using a tele-
scopic camera. Finally, we repeated the same experiment with
invisible light using an IR projector (the IR projector can be
seen in figure 12c) from a distance of 20 meters and success-
fully infiltrated the command "erase file xxx.doc". As dis-
cussed in section 4, we could even increase the distance using
a lens and a stronger laser.
9. Infiltration of commands with no clear
line of sight to the scanner
The second scenario demonstrates an attack using an internal
light source (within the organization) when a clear line of sight
to the scanner is not available and external light source can not
be used. We implement the second type of attack using an inter-
nal IoT device that produces light either directly or indirectly.
More precisely, the attacker performs a functional attack (as
was described in [29]) on an IoT device inside an organization
to produce the light sequence of a given command while the
malware launches a scan and extracts the command from it.
IoT devices have become increasingly popular in the recent
years and are widely sold. They can be controlled from vari-
1https://youtu.be/vy8dKaHNB-A
Figure 13: Schema of the attack using hijacked internal light source
Figure 14: Left to right: (a) Passing car (circled in green) attacks a scanner located in an office (circled in red), (b) The
attacked office from the inside, the bulb (circled in yellow), the scanner (circled in blue) that is hidden behind a close curtain,
(c) The hijacked smart bulb (MagicBlue)
ous types of controllers (e.g., smartphones, PCs, smart remotes)
using different protocols such as WiFi, infrared, Zigbee[37],
Bluetooth, and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [34]. In practice,
many commercial devices do not implement strong authenti-
cation mechanisms (some don’t even implement any authenti-
cation mechanisms at all) exposing them to different kinds of
attacks, including replay attacks (hijacking the device). For
example, a television news report recently prompted viewers’
Amazon Echo devices to order unwanted dollhouses [9]. The
same thing happened to Google’s assitant as a result of Google
Home’s Super Bowl ad[4]. Commercial Smart Bulbs were also
found vulnerable to attacks on their bridge using external Zig-
Bee signal [28, 24] and many BLE devices (even smart locks)
were founded to be vulnerable to different kind of attacks, in-
cluding hijacking[18, 27, 15].
In this scenario the attacker exploits : (1) the unauthenticated
protocols of IoT devices, and (2) the ability to produce a light
from a specific IoT device which its light reflections can be
received by the scanner. The attacker hijacks an IoT device
with that produces lights in order to modulate the command to
the scanner. The attacker can either attack an IoT device whose
purpose is to illuminate (e.g., a smart bulb) or attack an IoT
device in which illumination is a side effect, (e.g., a smart TV).
This attack scenario is preferable to the previously one described
in the article, because there is no clear line of sight between the
attacker and the scanner. However, in this scenario the attacker
did manage to hijack an IoT device,located close enough to the
scanner, in such a way that the produced lights from the IoT
device effects the scanner’s output. In this scenario the attacker
attacks the scanner indirectly by attacking the IoT device.
Figure 13 outlines the attack. First, the attacker hijacks an IoT
device and use it to modulate the command as a sequence of
lights. The scanner, which was scheduled to launch a scan by
the malware, scans the reflections of the lights produced by the
IoT device to an image and the malware extracts the signal from
the scan and executes the command. In the current scenario
the acknowledgment from the malware side is not part of the
protocol (there is no clear line of sight to the scanner).
9.1 Experimental Setup
In our experiment we decided to attack a commercial smart
bulb in order to infiltrate the required command to the orga-
nization via the scanner. Smart bulbs have been shown to be
vulnerable to hijacking in various researches [31, 10, 6, 28].
The ability to control (hijack) a smart bulb inside an organiza-
tion enables the attacker to exploit the known "on" and "off"
commands to modulate the light sequence of a command.
We attacked the same organization mentioned in the previous
scenario. However, this time we attacked a different room which
contained a scanner and a Magic Blue UU E27 Bulb[3] (pre-
sented in figure 14c). The scanner, as can be seen in figure 14b,
is hidden behind a closed window and a clear line of sight does
not exist. The MagicBlue smart bulb exposes BLE API for
control. The BLE protocol has become quite popular for IoT
devices, and it provides the ability to control from short dis-
tances (less than 100 meters). This bulb does not contain any
type of authentication mechanism (as was found by [31]). We
reverse engineered by triggering commands using its official
application [26] and sniffing the BLE traffic that was transmit-
ted from the Android device. We used Wireshark [2] to parse
the PCAP file that was produced by the Android and found the
commands:
Figure 15: Extracted Signal encrypt dir q, from top to bottom: (a) The original signal, (b) the signal after contrast, (c) line
averaging (c) Stretching unpadding and ASCI representation
BLE Command Functionality
0xCC2333 ON
0xCC2433 OFF
0x56FFFFFF00F0AA Max Brightness
0x5600000000F0AA Min Brightness
It is important to note that many kind of commercial smart
bulbs are vulnerable to hijacking as was shown in the past [31,
28, 10, 6, 24]. The contribution of this attack is that it shows
that despite the fact that smart bulb does not contain any impor-
tant information and might cause a minor damage if a external
attacker has manage to hijack it (as opposed smart locks for ex-
ample), the bulb can cause big damage when used as a mediator
in attacks.
In our study we performed the attack in different experimental
setups and different rates to produce the required light sequence
in order to infiltrate the data. We found that even the slightest
change of brightness (5%) produced by the bulb can be detected
by the scanner (e.g., changing the brightness of a bulb from
100% to 95%). Also, as described in section 7 we found that
lights that produced by the bulb during a daylight were detected
by the scanner. Also, we found that we are able switch the
bulb states in frequencies less than 25 milliseconds, rates that
will not be detected by the human eye, but as was shown in
section 4.4, we would have to add the malware’s code an error
correcting code for this purpose.
9.2 Results
Finally, we present the attack in the context of triggering a ran-
somware (with hardcoded key) given a directory, from a pass-
ing car (figure 14a) on a scanner located in the 3rd floor (figure
14b) behind a closed curtain with no line of sight using hijacked
smart bulb, in the evening. The driver held a Samsung Galaxy
S4 while driving in order to perform the attack from, a ded-
icated application that we wrote and installed on the Galaxy.
The application scans for a MagicBlue smart bulb and connects
to it. After connection, the application modulates a given com-
mand as light sequence using a series of "on" (1 bit) and "off"
(0 bit) signals sent from over a BLE channel. The attack was
recorded using a video camera and can be seen on the link2. 2
We used the same malware as described in 6, so the selected
transmission rate was picked to be 100 milliseconds (that does
not require any error correcting code). We infiltrated 40 bits
(four bytes of data plus one byte of padding). The entire attack
lasted for four seconds. The malware as explained in section
6 is independent of the number of bits as well as the rate of
transmission and does not require any error correcting code.
The signal "en q" that is correlated to "encrypt directory q" was
extracted by the malware in real-time and presented in figure
15.
10. Limitations
Our method is effective with a partially open scanner or an open
scanner. In our experiments we were unable to infiltrate a signal
when the scanner was completely closed since light can not be
projected on the pane when the scanner is closed. Since most of
the organizations don’t require closing scanners after each scan,
and it is not out the question that an organization’s employees
could get paid by an attacker to intentionally leave a scanner
open, opportunities exist to use our method.
11. Counter Measures
Since manufacturers don’t consider scanners a mean to infil-
trate data, they offer Ethernet and WiFi connectivity and drivers
in order to support remote and direct scanning. As was shown
in section ??, limiting the line of sight to scanners by position-
ing them behind a wall doesn’t provide a solution for the threat
(shown in section ??).
Various solutions can be used to automatically prevent/detect
the threat, rather than relying on the awareness of individuals
within an organization to close the scanner after completing
a scan including: (1) disconnecting the scanner from the net-
work. Many scanners support scanning directly to a disk on
key device using USB interface. Doing so, prevents an attacker
2https://youtu.be/jHb9vOqviGA
from establishing the covert channel in this paper. This might
be considered an extreme solution, since it also limits printing
and faxing remotely, if the scanner is part of an all-in-one de-
vice. (2) Extending the scanner’s remote protocol to support
two levels of authentication.
However, we believe that a proxy based solution will prevent
the attacker from establishing such a covert channel without the
need to apply extreme changes. The scanner will be connected
by a wire directly (e.g., using a USB interface) to a computer
(proxy) within the organization’s network instead of being con-
nected to the network. The proxy will provide an API. When a
scanning request is received, the computer initiates a scan and
processes the output in a classifier in order to detect malicious
scan. If the scanning was classified as benign, the output is re-
turned to the entity that requested the scan. Otherwise, the scan
will be stored on the proxy for analysis of the IT team. The
classifier’s logic for detection of suspicious scans can be based
on (1) robotic detection or anomaly detection by analyzing the
characteristic of the scan (e.g. unusual hour of the day), or (2)
raw data analysis (the scan output) using a machine learning
model that was trained on malicious/benign scans.
12. Summary
In this research we showed how a simple organization’s scanner
can be used in order to establish a covert channel between an
outside attacker and a malware installed on one of the comput-
ers in the organization. We showed that even physical obstacles
(e.g., high distance, high floor, and hidden scanner) do not pre-
vent an attacker from establishing the described covert channel.
We hope our study will increase the awareness to the threat and
will result in secured protocols for scanning that will prevent
an attacker from establishing such a covert channel specifically
in the era of Internet of Things.
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